Blatant,not Latent:塞尔维亚高层任命的赞助人

IF 1.1 Q3 PUBLIC ADMINISTRATION
Slobodan Tomić, D. Pavlović
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引用次数: 1

摘要

摘要本文考察了塞尔维亚的政党赞助模式及其对公共行政专业化的影响。根据对塞尔维亚国家银行、反腐败局和塞尔维亚电子工业三个著名公共组织负责人的任命和随后表现的案例研究,我们证明,尽管努力实施韦伯里亚的中立能力原则,即精英统治凌驾于党派关系之上,但塞尔维亚的庇护不仅持续存在,而且变得更加公开和具有侵略性。既定的庇护模式包括追求党派庇护的多种功能——资源提取、党派竞选(包括通过庇护主义),以及策略控制。我们认为,这种模式导致任命不合格的个人担任最高职位,导致公共机构治理不善和效率低下。研究结果表明(改革逆转)情景,偏离了后共产主义欧洲采用韦伯里亚标准后通常观察到的温和进步或停滞的轨迹。作为一项概念贡献,该论文围绕各种赞助模式的危害性问题发展了一种类型学,捕捉了赞助模式和反赞助模式的轨迹-与比较赞助模式的现有框架相比,赞助发展更加微妙。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Blatant, not Latent: Patronage in Top-Level Appointments in Serbia
Abstract This paper examines the model of party patronage in Serbia and its impact on the professionalisation of public administration. Drawing on case studies of the appointment and subsequent performance of heads of three prominent public organisations‐the National Bank of Serbia, the Anti‐Corruption Agency, and the Electro Industry of Serbia‐we demonstrate that, despite efforts to implement the Weberian principle of (neutral competence which involves the prevalence of meritocracy over partisan affiliation, patronage in Serbia has not only persisted but has become more overt and invasive. The given model of patronage involves the pursuit of multiple functions of partisan patronage‐resource extraction, partisan campaigning (including through clientelism), and policy control. We suggest that this model results in the appointment of unqualified individuals to top positions, leading to poor governance and low efficiency of public institutions. The findings point to a (reform reversal” scenario, which departs from the trajectory of mild progress or stagnation usually observed in other cases across post‐communist Europe that follow the adoption ofWeberian standards. As a conceptual contribution, the paper develops a typology, centered around the question of perniciousness of various patronage models, that captures patronage models and trajectories of anti‐patronage developments in a more nuanced manner than the existing frameworks that compare patronage patterns.
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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.70
自引率
18.20%
发文量
10
审稿时长
6 weeks
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