Rationales of risk and uncertainty and their epistemological foundation by new phenomenology

Abstract Risk studies have shown that many people rather than following rational means of managing risk refer to non-rational (hope, faith) and in-between rationales (trust, intuition), which are not irrational but reasonable and based on subjective experiences, which are difficult to overcome by the communication of mere expert knowledge. We suggest that the problem of analyzing subjective risk management can be itemized as a result of the tension between subjective and objectified forms of certitudes. To clarify this distinction, the article turns to the New Phenomenology of Hermann Schmitz for outlining the different epistemological foundations of rational, non-rational and in-between rationales. We then develop a model of three different forms of knowledge that are involved in subjective risk management and elaborate the basic neo-phenomenological distinction of subjective and objective facts by differentiating the latter ones into rational and non-rational ones. We conclude with considering consequences of these epistemological challenges for risk communication.