Parecidos de familia: contenido e importancia de una idea de Wittgenstein

According to the main thesis of this article, in order to articulate the scope and interest of Wittgenstein’s family resemblances topic, we should see into it not an answer to the question what concepts in general are, but a methodological proposal. Two questions guide the central part of the text: (1) What does “family - resemblances concepts” mean? (2) What concepts fall within the corresponding class? Regarding (1) I try to show that “family - resemblances concepts” is not an unequivocal term: a first sense has to do with the dictum of “similarities overlapping and criss - crossing” (IF 67) and is to be distinguished from a second sense associated with the topic of “blurred edges” (IF 71). This distinction lies behind the answer I offer to (2): in the first sense of the term, there is no family concept at all, while according to the second sense all concepts are of this kind. In the final part I propose a reinterpretation of the issue from a methodological perspective. To say that concepts like language, understanding, thinking, etc. are family concepts means that the philosophical reflection on them should not centre on the praxis of looking for definitions. As important ― maybe more important ― as that it’s the careful description of paradigmatic examples, as “centers of variation” (EPB 190).