{"title":"阿曼繁忙的审计委员会董事和公司叙述披露","authors":"Hidaya Al Lawati, K. Hussainey, R. Sagitova","doi":"10.1108/raf-11-2022-0326","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"\nPurpose\nThis study aims to examine whether, and which type of, busy audit committee (AC) directors affect the quality and quantity of forward-looking disclosure (FLD).\n\n\nDesign/methodology/approach\nThe authors use content analysis to measure the quality and quantity of FLD. The authors use a sample of Omani financial institutions listed on the Muscat Securities Market for the period 2014–2018.\n\n\nFindings\nThe authors find that overlapped AC chairs and total overlapped AC directors negatively (positively) affect disclosure quantity (quality). The authors also find that overlapped AC directors with financial expertise and those with multiple directorships positively affect disclosure quantity and quality.\n\n\nOriginality/value\nThis study offers new insights to policymakers (and managers) as it informs them about the benefits of overlapping AC directorship. It suggests that corporate governance codes should not limit overlapped AC direcotorship.\n","PeriodicalId":21152,"journal":{"name":"Review of Accounting and Finance","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":3.6000,"publicationDate":"2023-05-24","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"2","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Busy audit committee directors and corporate narrative disclosure in Oman\",\"authors\":\"Hidaya Al Lawati, K. Hussainey, R. Sagitova\",\"doi\":\"10.1108/raf-11-2022-0326\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"\\nPurpose\\nThis study aims to examine whether, and which type of, busy audit committee (AC) directors affect the quality and quantity of forward-looking disclosure (FLD).\\n\\n\\nDesign/methodology/approach\\nThe authors use content analysis to measure the quality and quantity of FLD. The authors use a sample of Omani financial institutions listed on the Muscat Securities Market for the period 2014–2018.\\n\\n\\nFindings\\nThe authors find that overlapped AC chairs and total overlapped AC directors negatively (positively) affect disclosure quantity (quality). The authors also find that overlapped AC directors with financial expertise and those with multiple directorships positively affect disclosure quantity and quality.\\n\\n\\nOriginality/value\\nThis study offers new insights to policymakers (and managers) as it informs them about the benefits of overlapping AC directorship. It suggests that corporate governance codes should not limit overlapped AC direcotorship.\\n\",\"PeriodicalId\":21152,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Review of Accounting and Finance\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":3.6000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-05-24\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"2\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Review of Accounting and Finance\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1108/raf-11-2022-0326\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Review of Accounting and Finance","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1108/raf-11-2022-0326","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Busy audit committee directors and corporate narrative disclosure in Oman
Purpose
This study aims to examine whether, and which type of, busy audit committee (AC) directors affect the quality and quantity of forward-looking disclosure (FLD).
Design/methodology/approach
The authors use content analysis to measure the quality and quantity of FLD. The authors use a sample of Omani financial institutions listed on the Muscat Securities Market for the period 2014–2018.
Findings
The authors find that overlapped AC chairs and total overlapped AC directors negatively (positively) affect disclosure quantity (quality). The authors also find that overlapped AC directors with financial expertise and those with multiple directorships positively affect disclosure quantity and quality.
Originality/value
This study offers new insights to policymakers (and managers) as it informs them about the benefits of overlapping AC directorship. It suggests that corporate governance codes should not limit overlapped AC direcotorship.