产品研发合作与企业绩效

IF 0.3 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

B E Journal of Theoretical Economics Pub Date : 2020-02-01 DOI:10.1515/bejte-2018-0141

M. Ramsza, A. Karbowski

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引用次数: 2

摘要

摘要本文研究了企业在需求增长型产品研发中的行为。我们考虑并比较了企业合作与非合作的研发投资环境。在非合作情景(研发竞争)中，企业单方面决定其研发投资和产出。在合作情景(研发合作)中，企业参与议价过程以达成具有约束力的研发协议。企业通过讨价还价可以达成研发协议，明确各自的研发投资水平。研发合作下的投资水平高于研发竞争下的投资水平。研发合作下的企业利润也高于研发竞争下的企业利润。研究发现，研发合作可以缓解个体研发投入的抑制作用，并作为促进产品创新和企业利润的战略工具。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Product R&D Coopetition and Firm Performance

Abstract We investigate firms’ behavior in demand-enhancing product R&D. We consider and compare a cooperative and non-cooperative R&D investment setting by firms. In a non-cooperative scenario (R&D competition), firms decide on their R&D investments and outputs unilaterally. In a cooperative scenario (R&D coopetition), firms engage in a bargaining process to reach a binding R&D agreement. Firms through bargaining can reach an R&D agreement which specifies their R&D investment levels. The investment levels under R&D coopetition are higher compared with the investment levels under R&D competition. Firms’ profits are also higher under R&D coopetition compared with R&D competition. We conclude that R&D coopetition can alleviate the individual R&D investment disincentive and work as a strategic instrument that enhances product innovation and firms’ profits.

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来源期刊

B E Journal of Theoretical Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

0.80

自引率

25.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： We welcome submissions in all areas of economic theory, both applied theory and \"pure\" theory. Contributions can be either innovations in economic theory or rigorous new applications of existing theory. Pure theory papers include, but are by no means limited to, those in behavioral economics and decision theory, game theory, general equilibrium theory, and the theory of economic mechanisms. Applications could encompass, but are by no means limited to, contract theory, public finance, financial economics, industrial organization, law and economics, and labor economics.