Implementing relational contracting in a public client organization: the influence of policy clashes, resources and project autonomy

Abstract Relational contracting models are increasingly being used for large and complex public infrastructure construction projects, but both practices and outcomes still widely vary. When analyzing the causes of failures and successes, most studies have focused on practices at the project level. In this paper, we add to the current understanding of relational contracting in public construction by examining the influence of factors at the organizational and institutional levels. We develop a framework based on theories of policy implementation and analyze two projects piloting a new Early Contractor Involvement model in a large public infrastructure client organization. In this case, a previous marketization policy, prescribing low client involvement in project processes, interfered with the relational contracting policy. This policy clash was not openly acknowledged from the start, despite causing significant confusion and frustration at the project level, but became recognizable largely through its consequences for resource allocation and managerial attention. We conclude that policy ambiguities, combined with a project-based implementation context, produce local interpretations and variations in relational contracting models. When project autonomy is high, industry-level agreements, standards and resources are important to align practices also between projects within the same client organization.