基于逆向物流的两个闭环供应链交互优化的博弈论方法

IF 1.8 Q3 COMPUTER SCIENCE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE
N. D. Trung, D. Huy, P. Chetthamrongchai, K. Mohsen, Ahmad Syarief Iskandar, A. Nurjaya, Denok Sunarsi, Krishanveer Singh, S. Chupradit
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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要在过去几年中,人们对再生产活动中出现的环境问题、法律必需品和经济优势的关注,引起了人们对闭环供应链形式的逆向物流活动的关注,无论是在工业还是科研中。本研究旨在对两个闭环三级供应链之间的竞争力进行建模和比较,每个供应链包括一个制造商、一个零售商和一个第三方来收集客户使用的产品,同时考虑到博弈论的概念和聚合的存在。此外,每个供应链都要考虑一个单独的供应商。在正向供应链中,制造商使用从消费者那里收集的新组件或重复使用的产品生产新产品,然后将这些产品主要出售给零售商,零售商将其出售。在反向链中,收集器在收集后将用过的产品提供给制造商。该研究利用博弈论的定义和概念将该闭环链建模为Stackelberg博弈,以获得批发和零售价格的最优值以及收集者的产品回报系数的最优值。最后,通过算例对模型进行了求解。鉴于这些结果,再制造成本在为这些链中的所有成员赚取更多利润方面发挥着重要作用,竞争链应尝试以更低的成本再制造产品。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Optimizing the Interaction Between Two Closed-Loop Supply Chains Based on Inverse Logistics Using the Game Theory Method
Abstract Over the past few years, attention to environmental problems, legal necessities, and economic advantages emerging from reproduction activities has attracted attention to reverse logistics activities in the form of a closed-loop supply chain, whether in industry or scientific research. The current study aims to model competitiveness and comparison between two closed-loop three-level supply chains, each of which includes a manufacturer, a retailer, and a third party to collect the products used by the customer, taking into account the concepts of game theory and the existence of aggregates. Moreover, a separate supplier for each chain is considered. In the forward supply chain, the manufacturer produces new products using new components or re-used products that have been collected from the consumer, then sells these products mainly to the retailer, and the retailer sells them. In the reverse chain, the collector provides the used products to the manufacturer after collection. The study utilized the definitions and concepts of game theory to model this closed loop chain as a Stackelberg game to obtain the optimal value of wholesale and retail price and the optimal value of the product return coefficient for the collector. Finally, the models based on some numerical examples are solved. Given the results, the remanufacturing costs have a significant role in making more profits for all members in such chains, and competitive chains should attempt to remanufacture the products at lower costs.
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来源期刊
Foundations of Computing and Decision Sciences
Foundations of Computing and Decision Sciences COMPUTER SCIENCE, ARTIFICIAL INTELLIGENCE-
CiteScore
2.20
自引率
9.10%
发文量
16
审稿时长
29 weeks
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