{"title":"科学的概念与哲学","authors":"Dmitry M. Koshlakov, A. Shvyrkov","doi":"10.5840/eps202057226","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"The authors try to show that even Wittgensteinian definition of concept is not always sufficient to analyze what really happens in science. As a result, in addition to “concept” we propose “conception” as a new promising tool for philosophy of science. The authors provide a brief historical analysis of this term and reveal two main interpretations of “conception” in philosophy and scientific disciplines. In accordance with the first view, conception appears as either a “twin” of the concept, or a pair entity to the concept. According to the second view, conception is a kind of “strange concept” that exists among “normal” concepts. Since conception is understood differently in sciences and philosophical systems, it is not possible to give a generalized definition of conception. That is, it is impossible to formulate this definition, so to speak, inductively. Moreover, even if it was possible, such a definition would not necessarily have to be automatically accepted by philosophy of science. That is why the introduction of a concept of conception was carried out through the analysis of a global process associated with the return of metaphysics to science. We define conception as a semantic construction denoting the unknown (and, possibly, fundamentally unknowable) and ensuring the possibility of working with this unknown (unknowable). By virtue of the way conception was introduced (conception is not a “generalization” of the interpretations available in specific sciences) many conceptions that are considered as conception in specific sciences turn out to not to be concepts within this definition. Thus, the article interprets concept as a new possible tool of philosophy of science, which is aimed at understanding how specific sciences develop.","PeriodicalId":44031,"journal":{"name":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","volume":"57 1","pages":"124-141"},"PeriodicalIF":0.2000,"publicationDate":"2020-05-27","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/eps202057226","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Conception and Philosophy of Science\",\"authors\":\"Dmitry M. Koshlakov, A. Shvyrkov\",\"doi\":\"10.5840/eps202057226\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"The authors try to show that even Wittgensteinian definition of concept is not always sufficient to analyze what really happens in science. As a result, in addition to “concept” we propose “conception” as a new promising tool for philosophy of science. The authors provide a brief historical analysis of this term and reveal two main interpretations of “conception” in philosophy and scientific disciplines. In accordance with the first view, conception appears as either a “twin” of the concept, or a pair entity to the concept. According to the second view, conception is a kind of “strange concept” that exists among “normal” concepts. Since conception is understood differently in sciences and philosophical systems, it is not possible to give a generalized definition of conception. That is, it is impossible to formulate this definition, so to speak, inductively. Moreover, even if it was possible, such a definition would not necessarily have to be automatically accepted by philosophy of science. That is why the introduction of a concept of conception was carried out through the analysis of a global process associated with the return of metaphysics to science. We define conception as a semantic construction denoting the unknown (and, possibly, fundamentally unknowable) and ensuring the possibility of working with this unknown (unknowable). By virtue of the way conception was introduced (conception is not a “generalization” of the interpretations available in specific sciences) many conceptions that are considered as conception in specific sciences turn out to not to be concepts within this definition. Thus, the article interprets concept as a new possible tool of philosophy of science, which is aimed at understanding how specific sciences develop.\",\"PeriodicalId\":44031,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki\",\"volume\":\"57 1\",\"pages\":\"124-141\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2020-05-27\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.5840/eps202057226\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"1085\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202057226\",\"RegionNum\":0,\"RegionCategory\":null,\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"0\",\"JCRName\":\"PHILOSOPHY\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Epistemology & Philosophy of Science-Epistemologiya i Filosofiya Nauki","FirstCategoryId":"1085","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.5840/eps202057226","RegionNum":0,"RegionCategory":null,"ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"0","JCRName":"PHILOSOPHY","Score":null,"Total":0}
The authors try to show that even Wittgensteinian definition of concept is not always sufficient to analyze what really happens in science. As a result, in addition to “concept” we propose “conception” as a new promising tool for philosophy of science. The authors provide a brief historical analysis of this term and reveal two main interpretations of “conception” in philosophy and scientific disciplines. In accordance with the first view, conception appears as either a “twin” of the concept, or a pair entity to the concept. According to the second view, conception is a kind of “strange concept” that exists among “normal” concepts. Since conception is understood differently in sciences and philosophical systems, it is not possible to give a generalized definition of conception. That is, it is impossible to formulate this definition, so to speak, inductively. Moreover, even if it was possible, such a definition would not necessarily have to be automatically accepted by philosophy of science. That is why the introduction of a concept of conception was carried out through the analysis of a global process associated with the return of metaphysics to science. We define conception as a semantic construction denoting the unknown (and, possibly, fundamentally unknowable) and ensuring the possibility of working with this unknown (unknowable). By virtue of the way conception was introduced (conception is not a “generalization” of the interpretations available in specific sciences) many conceptions that are considered as conception in specific sciences turn out to not to be concepts within this definition. Thus, the article interprets concept as a new possible tool of philosophy of science, which is aimed at understanding how specific sciences develop.
期刊介绍:
Epistemology & Philosophy of Science is a quarterly peer-reviewed journal established in 2004 by the Institute of Philosophy (Russian Academy of Sciences). It is devoted to the themes in modern epistemology, philosophy of science, philosophy of language, and philosophy of mind. The journal supports the policy of interdisciplinarity. It’s based on the belief that the comprehensive analysis of cultural phenomena couldn’t be completed without focusing on the problems of cognition. The epistemological analysis, however, needs the research results from human, social and natural sciences. Sections of the journal: 1.Editorial 2.Panel Discussion 3.Epistemology and Cognition 4.Language and Mind 5.Vista 6.Case Studies -Science Studies 7.Interdisciplinary Studies 8.Archive 9.Symposium 10.Book Reviews