Oriol Sabaté, Sergio Espuelas, Alfonso Herranz-Loncán
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MILITARY WAGES AND COUPS D’ÉTAT IN SPAIN (1850–1915): THE USE OF PUBLIC SPENDING AS A COUP-PROOFING STRATEGY
ABSTRACT In 1833-1874, Spain suffered 0.7 coups per year. By contrast, the Restoration (1874-1923) saw the eradication of successful coups. This can be partially attributed to the turno pacífico, which allowed the main political parties to alternate in office without dragging the military into politics. We suggest, however, that the reduction in coup risk was also associated with a conscious budget policy. This, though, did not rely on increases in total military expenditure (which actually stagnated during most of the Restoration), but on the steady improvement of officers' remunerations and promotions. This strategy was probably detrimental to Spanish military capacity abroad, but was consistent with the objective of keeping the military out of politics.