Non-Competition Interests in EU Antitrust Law: An Empirical Study of Article 101 TFEU by Or Brook. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2022, 548 pp (£120 hardback) ISBN: 978-1-108-83760-6

Every so often, a book can jolt us out of the way in which we have been used to thinking about our own discipline. As Or Brook herself recognises, an ‘impressive array of legal scholarship’ has debated the objectives of EU competition policy, the impact of the so-called ‘more economic approach’, and the role of sustainability and other non-market related factors, in the application of competition law generally and Article 101 TFEU specifically. However, starting from a relatively narrow (if ambitious) set of research questions, Brook prompts the reader to consider the very essence of administrative action. Especially after Regulation 1/2003 (the Modernisation Regulation), and the adoption of the so-called ‘more economic approach’ to competition law enforcement, competition enforcers have opted for administrative discretion (to set their priorities, or to open and close cases) over the transparent enforcement of the rules. This has serious consequences for predictability and legal certainty. As the title makes clear, the focus of the investigation is Article 101 TFEU (specifically Article 101 (1) and Article 101(3)). Chapter 1 sets the scene, laying out the research questions, the methodology and the definitions used. The research questions aim to assess the evolution of ‘the rationale, method and limits for balancing competition and non-competition interests in the enforcement of Article 101 TFEU’. Brook takes a narrow approach to the term ‘competition interests’, defined as the ‘core value protected by Article 101 TFEU, namely the promotion of competition process and structure’. This definition is in line with previous academic works, as well as the European Commission (the