公共采购条例对竞争和成本效益的影响

IF 1.4 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Journal of Regulatory Economics Pub Date : 2019-03-01 DOI:10.2139/ssrn.3607128

B. Tas

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引用次数: 8

摘要

本研究通过采用世界银行的基准公共采购和EuroPAM公共采购质量评分，实证调查了公共采购监管质量对招标竞争和已授予合同的成本效益的影响。本文分析了欧洲经济区、瑞士和马其顿的大量公共采购数据，结果表明，高质量的公共采购监管制度与更高水平的竞争和成本效益相关。监管质量的提高显著增加了投标人的数量和采购价格低于预计成本的概率。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Effect of public procurement regulation on competition and cost-effectiveness

This study empirically investigates the impact of public procurement regulation quality on the competition for tenders and the cost-effectiveness of awarded contracts, by employing the World Bank’s Benchmarking Public Procurement and EuroPAM Public Procurement quality scores. Using extensive data on public procurement in the European Economic Area, Switzerland, and Macedonia, the analysis in this paper shows that higher quality public procurement regulatory regimes are associated with higher levels of competition and cost-effectiveness. Improved regulation quality significantly increases the number of bidders and the probability that the procurement price is lower than the estimated cost.

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来源期刊

Journal of Regulatory Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

2.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Recent legislative and policy reforms have changed the nature of regulation. Partial deregulation has created a new dimension to regulatory problems, as the debate is extended to include diversification and new forms of regulation. The introduction of incentive-based rate schedules and ratemaking procedures, the integration of demand-side programs with planning for capitol expansion, and other developments, raise a host of theoretical and empirical questions. The Journal of Regulatory Economics serves as a high quality forum for the analysis of regulatory theories and institutions by developing the rigorous economics foundations of regulation. Both theoretical and applied works, including experimental research, are encouraged. Research in all aspects of regulation is of interest including traditional problems of natural monopoly, antitrust and competition policy, incentive regulation, deregulation, auction theory, new policy instruments, health and safety regulation, environmental regulation, insurance and financial regulation, hazardous and solid waste regulation, universal service obligation, and consumer product regulation. The JRE provides researchers, policy-makers, and institutions with current perspectives on the theory and practice of economics of regulation. While there are a number of journals and magazines that include the study of regulation, the JRE is unique in that it fills a gap in the market for a high quality journal dealing solely with the economics of regulation.Officially cited as: J Regul Econ