股东投票监督:代理权竞争的新证据

IF 6.8 1区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Review of Financial Studies Pub Date : 2023-08-12 DOI:10.1093/rfs/hhad066

Alon Brav, Wei Jiang, Tao Li, James Pinnington

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们提出了共同基金在代理权竞争中投票的第一个综合研究。在进行投票的竞争中，被动型基金投票给持不同政见者的可能性比主动型基金低10个百分点。如果考虑到管理层提名、已确定的竞争和非“三大”基金家族的投票，这一差距将显著缩小。被动型基金和主动型基金同样了解公司的基本面，尽管被动型基金在比赛期间比主动型基金更频繁地查看与比赛相关的SEC文件，无论是绝对水平还是相对于非比赛时期的增量。我们得出结论，被动型基金是参与高风险投票事件的股东。

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Shareholder Monitoring through Voting: New Evidence from Proxy Contests

We present the first comprehensive study of mutual fund voting in proxy contests. Among contests where voting takes place, passive funds are 10 percentage points less likely than active funds to vote for dissidents. The gap shrinks significantly when accounting for votes withheld from management nominees, settled contests, and votes by non- “Big-Three” fund families. Passive and active funds are equally informed about firm fundamentals, although passive funds view contest-related SEC filings more often than active funds during contests, in absolute levels and incrementally relative to noncontest periods. We conclude that passive funds are engaged shareholders in high-stakes voting events.

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来源期刊

Review of Financial Studies Multiple-

CiteScore

16.00

自引率

2.40%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Review of Financial Studies is a prominent platform that aims to foster and widely distribute noteworthy research in financial economics. With an expansive editorial board, the Review strives to maintain a balance between theoretical and empirical contributions. The primary focus of paper selection is based on the quality and significance of the research to the field of finance, rather than its level of technical complexity. The scope of finance within the Review encompasses its intersection with economics. Sponsoring The Society for Financial Studies, the Review and the Society appoint editors and officers through limited terms.