The Expressive Power of the N-Operator and the Decidability of Logic in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus

The present text discusses whether there is a tension between aphorisms 6.1-6.13 of the Tractatus and the Church-Turing theorem about the decidability of predicate logic. We attempt to establish the following points: (i) Aphorisms 6.1-6.13 are not consistent with the Church-Turing theorem. (ii) The logical symbolism of the Tractatus, built from the N-operator, can (and should) be interpreted as expressively complete with respect to first-order formulas. (iii) Wittgenstein’s reasons for believing that Logic is decidable were purely philosophical and the undecidability result shows that there are aspects of his criticisms of Frege and Russell that become unjustified in light of these results.