合理的沟通平衡

IF 10.5 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

American Economic Review Pub Date : 2021-09-01 DOI:10.1257/AER.20201692

Daniel Clark, D. Fudenberg

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引用次数: 8

摘要

合理通信平衡(JCE)是针对带有廉价通信的信号游戏的平衡优化。当接收方最初信任并且发送方比接收方玩的次数更多时，策略概要文件必须是JCE才能成为非均衡学习的稳定结果。在学习模型中，非正式地用于激励过去改进的反事实“演讲”是实际发送的信息。稳定的剖面不一定是完美的贝叶斯均衡，因此JCE有时保留了现有改进消除的均衡。尽管如此，它类似于D1和NWBR的早期改进，并且在共单调信号游戏中与它们一致。

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Justified Communication Equilibrium

Justified communication equilibrium (JCE) is an equilibrium refinement for signaling games with cheap-talk communication. A strategy profile must be a JCE to be a stable outcome of nonequilibrium learning when receivers are initially trusting and senders play many more times than receivers. In the learning model, the counterfactual "speeches" that have been informally used to motivate past refinements are messages that are actually sent. Stable profiles need not be perfect Bayesian equilibria, so JCE sometimes preserves equilibria that existing refinements eliminate. Despite this, it resembles the earlier refinements D1 and NWBR, and it coincides with them in co-monotonic signaling games.

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来源期刊

American Economic Review ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

18.60

自引率

2.80%

发文量

122

期刊介绍： The American Economic Review (AER) stands as a prestigious general-interest economics journal. Founded in 1911, it holds the distinction of being one of the nation's oldest and most esteemed scholarly journals in economics. With a commitment to academic excellence, the AER releases 12 issues annually, featuring articles that span a wide spectrum of economic topics.