A Tale of a Rentier Social Contract and Diminishing Economic Rents: Multinationalism and Resource-Seeking Capital in Contemporary Africa

Abstract The invisible hand of private global enterprises in the political and economic landscape of Africa’s rentier states best exemplifies the extent to which Multinational Corporations (MNCs) now personify the variant/competing strategic resource-seeking interests of two fronts, i.e., (i) the emerging economy MNCs [BRICS nations, with China and Russia in particular] and (ii) the EU (European Union) and North American states. We have also seen from these fronts, a growing prioritization of economic/political hegemonies over mutually-beneficial bilateral relationships that ensure shared economic development and stability (with respect to ideals, such as good governance, human rights, and democracy) in the Global South. Inadvertently, this has emboldened the proliferation of oligarchs and shadow states whose resilience is contingent upon the existence of autocratic infrastructure, inequality, and a shrinking democratic space. In rentier states, such as the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), positive spillovers (in both development and economic terms) have been dwindling—notwithstanding the ubiquity of private global enterprises therein. Using the Rentier State theory and the Agency thesis, the article explores the operations of MNCs in Africa. Through a content analysis of literature on global capital, institutions, and the role of multinationals in resource rich states, the article focuses on the DRC to highlight what we know and do not know on the negative side of globalization. Some of the negative outcomes of the unregulated power of private global enterprises (as discussed in the article) include their involvement in electoral process interferences, authoritarian collaborations, the establishment of oligopolies, shadow states, etc., to the detriment of equitable development (within rentier states), and a salience of inequities within the global natural resource trade.