作为一阶谓词的存在性：来自Mirdamad的主题

IF 0.5 2区哲学 0 ASIAN STUDIES

ASIAN PHILOSOPHY Pub Date : 2021-05-14 DOI:10.1080/09552367.2021.1928201

Davood Hosseini

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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要活跃于伊斯兰世界的中世纪晚期著名哲学家米尔达马德认为存在在现实中是虚无的。在这篇论文中，我采用了当代分析哲学家设计的方法来重新解释他的存在论。根据我的理解，这种存在论有很多方面。在形而上学上，存在在现实中毫无意义。实际上，它不是个人的财产。从逻辑上讲，“存在”是一个一阶谓词。为了使这两种主张一致，他发展了一种稀疏的性质理论，提出了对“存在”意义的分析，呼吁对形而上学语言的元形而上学观点，发展了真理的真理论，并致力于一种特定的基础理论。可以说，从当代分析的角度来看，这种存在论似乎是站得住脚的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Existence as a first-order predicate: Themes from Mirdamad

ABSTRACT Mirdamad, a prominent philosopher of the Late Medieval Period active in the Islamic world, regards existence as nothing in reality. In this paper, I employ methods devised by contemporary analytic philosophers to reinterpret his theory of existence. Based on my interpretation, this theory of existence has many aspects. Metaphysically, existence is nothing in reality. In effect, it is not a property of individuals. Logically, ‘existence’ is a first-order predicate. In order to make these two claims consistent, he develops a sparse theory of properties, proposes an analysis of the meaning of ‘existence’, appeals to a meta-metaphysical view about the language of metaphysics, develops a truthmaker theory of truth, and commits to a specific theory of grounding. Arguably, this theory of existence seems to be tenable from a contemporary analytic perspective.

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来源期刊

ASIAN PHILOSOPHY Multiple-

CiteScore

0.90

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： Asian Philosophy is an international journal concerned with such philosophical traditions as Indian, Chinese, Japanese, Buddhist and Islamic. The purpose of the journal is to bring these rich and varied traditions to a worldwide academic audience. It publishes articles in the central philosophical areas of metaphysics, philosophy of mind, epistemology, logic, moral and social philosophy, as well as in applied philosophical areas such as aesthetics and jurisprudence. It also publishes articles comparing Eastern and Western philosophical traditions.