饥荒、富裕和不道德

IF 0.7 Q4 ETHICS
David Sackris
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引用次数: 3

摘要

我认为,关于第一人称道德判断的性质的争论,即这种道德判断是否具有内在的动机(内在主义),或者道德判断是否可以在没有动机的情况下进行(外在主义),可能建立在一个错误的假设上:道德判断是一种独特的类型,在行动动机方面必须具有一些共同的基本特征。我认为,通过考虑一个普通的案例,没有什么理由认为第一人称道德判断在这方面形成了一个同质的阶层:彼得·辛格的《饥荒、富裕和道德》的学生读者。内在主义者和外在主义者都无法提供令人满意的解释,解释为什么我们的学生在这种特殊情况下没有采取行动,但在大多数情况下,他们的道德判断会激励他们采取行动。我认为,无法提供令人满意的描述源于对道德判断性质的共同假设。一旦我们考虑拒绝接受第一人称道德决策以通常假设的方式形成一种独特的观点,那么内部主义/外部主义的辩论可能会变得毫无意义。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
Famine, Affluence, and Amorality
I argue that the debate concerning the nature of first-person moral judgment, namely, whether such moral judgments are inherently motivating (internalism) or whether moral judgments can be made in the absence of motivation (externalism), may be founded on a faulty assumption: that moral judgments form a distinct kind that must have some shared, essential features in regards to motivation to act. I argue that there is little reason to suppose that first-person moral judgments form a homogenous class in this respect by considering an ordinary case: student readers of Peter Singer’s “Famine, Affluence, and Morality”. Neither internalists nor externalists can provide a satisfying account as to why our students fail to act in this particular case, but are motivated to act by their moral judgments in most cases. I argue that the inability to provide a satisfying account is rooted in this shared assumption about the nature of moral judgments. Once we consider rejecting the notion that first-person moral decision- making forms a distinct kind in the way it is typically assumed, the internalist/externalist debate may be rendered moot.
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来源期刊
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy
European Journal of Analytic Philosophy Arts and Humanities-Philosophy
CiteScore
1.50
自引率
0.00%
发文量
4
审稿时长
22 weeks
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