The Svalbard Treaty and research: Comment to Pedersen and Molenaar

Norway has been very clear about its determination to uphold sovereignty over Svalbard, based on the 1920 Svalbard Treaty. Thus, any challenges or attempts to undermine Norwegian sovereignty should be taken seriously. Torbjørn Pedersen discusses in his article ‘The Politics of Research Presence in Svalbard’ in this issue to what extent some of the foreign scientific research on Svalbard should be seen as national posturing, threatening Norwegian sovereignty. However, it is important to distinguish between intentions and effects of any national posturing. As Pedersen notes, the relevant activities must be interpreted: are they based on scientific or other relevant needs, or are meant to challenge Norwegian sovereign right to regulate activities on Svalbard. Only the latter forms of activities should be subject to concern. Secondly, the different measures taken by other states should be individually assessed. For example, the name of a research station would hardly in itself be a challenge, whereas the Chinese request for an international decision-making process in the adoption of a research strategy for NyÅlesund may give reason to worry. Thirdly, a distinction should be made between internal national communications and external international demands. Only the latter has the ability to be interpreted as a challenge. Finally, there is reason to emphasise that no state has an interest in an unregulated power struggle. Instead, they have a common interest in acknowledging Norway as a regulatory Hobbesian Leviathan, securing a common peaceful order. I will not discuss the policy aspects further, but – like Erik Molenaar – concentrate on the legal aspects, i.e. the interpretation of the Svalbard Treaty. Molenaar submits that article 5(2) of the Svalbard Treaty contains three ‘implicit assumptions or understandings: