非对称成本下的网络外部性与下游合谋

IF 0.6 Q4 ECONOMICS

Games Pub Date : 2023-03-30 DOI:10.3390/g14020029

Jen-Yao Lee, Chen-Chia Fan, C. Tsai

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文考虑了具有网络外部性和成本不对称的垂直市场中下游竞争的共谋稳定性。构造了一个动态共谋博弈，并采用后向归纳法求解子博弈的完全纳什均衡。我们发现，较大的网络外部性会导致低效企业的共谋激励减少，而对于高效企业，这取决于效率差距。当成本不对称性较大且网络外部性相对较弱时，网络外部性的增加将破坏下游共谋的稳定。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Network Externalities and Downstream Collusion under Asymmetric Costs: A Note

This paper considers the collusive stability of downstream competition in a vertical market with network externalities and cost asymmetry. A dynamic collusion game is constructed, and backward induction is employed to solve the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. We show that larger network externalities lead to less collusive incentive for an inefficient firm, while for an efficient firm, this depends on the efficiency gap. An increase in network externalities will destabilize the downstream collusion when the cost asymmetry is large and network externalities are relatively weak.

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来源期刊

Games Decision Sciences-Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

11.10%

发文量

审稿时长

11 weeks

期刊介绍： Games (ISSN 2073-4336) is an international, peer-reviewed, quick-refereeing open access journal (free for readers), which provides an advanced forum for studies related to strategic interaction, game theory and its applications, and decision making. The aim is to provide an interdisciplinary forum for all behavioral sciences and related fields, including economics, psychology, political science, mathematics, computer science, and biology (including animal behavior). To guarantee a rapid refereeing and editorial process, Games follows standard publication practices in the natural sciences.