{"title":"槽位分配问题中Vickrey规则的表征","authors":"Yu Zhou, Youngsub Chun, Shigehiro Serizawa","doi":"10.1111/ijet.12306","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<p>We study the slot allocation problem where agents have quasi-linear single-peaked preferences over slots and identify the rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality. Since the quasi-linear single-peaked domain is not connected, the famous characterization of the Vickrey rule in terms of Holmström (1979)'s three properties cannot be applied. However, we are able to establish that on the quasi-linear single-peaked domain, the Vickrey rule is still the only rule satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality.</p>","PeriodicalId":44551,"journal":{"name":"International Journal of Economic Theory","volume":"18 1","pages":"38-49"},"PeriodicalIF":0.5000,"publicationDate":"2021-05-28","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/ijet.12306","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems\",\"authors\":\"Yu Zhou, Youngsub Chun, Shigehiro Serizawa\",\"doi\":\"10.1111/ijet.12306\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<p>We study the slot allocation problem where agents have quasi-linear single-peaked preferences over slots and identify the rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality. Since the quasi-linear single-peaked domain is not connected, the famous characterization of the Vickrey rule in terms of Holmström (1979)'s three properties cannot be applied. However, we are able to establish that on the quasi-linear single-peaked domain, the Vickrey rule is still the only rule satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality.</p>\",\"PeriodicalId\":44551,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"International Journal of Economic Theory\",\"volume\":\"18 1\",\"pages\":\"38-49\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":0.5000,\"publicationDate\":\"2021-05-28\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"https://sci-hub-pdf.com/10.1111/ijet.12306\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"International Journal of Economic Theory\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ijet.12306\",\"RegionNum\":4,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q4\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"International Journal of Economic Theory","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/ijet.12306","RegionNum":4,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q4","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
A characterization of the Vickrey rule in slot allocation problems
We study the slot allocation problem where agents have quasi-linear single-peaked preferences over slots and identify the rules satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality. Since the quasi-linear single-peaked domain is not connected, the famous characterization of the Vickrey rule in terms of Holmström (1979)'s three properties cannot be applied. However, we are able to establish that on the quasi-linear single-peaked domain, the Vickrey rule is still the only rule satisfying efficiency, strategy-proofness, and individual rationality.
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