Drivers of Access Right Sales: The Role of Resource Volatility and Individual Shocks in the Alaska Salmon Fishery

This paper explores why salmon harvesters in rural Alaska choose to sell their transferable permits. Household survey data from 10 remote Alaskan villages is combined with data on individual landings. Drift permit holders are more likely to sell their permits when average permit prices are low due to volatility in salmon runs or competition from aquaculture. These participants in the capital-intensive sector of the fishery are more likely to be in debt and liquidate assets under financial duress. Conversely, set net permit holders are more likely to liquidate their assets following life events such as the birth of a child or a divorce. For both types of permit holders, covariate shocks to salmon runs and prices are more important predictors of sale than individual productivity within the fishery. These results demonstrate that in the context of highly variable salmon runs, the transferability of property rights may undermine the economic sustainability of coastal communities.