反绿色反托拉斯案

Q2 Social Sciences

European Competition Journal Pub Date : 2022-03-28 DOI:10.1080/17441056.2022.2056346

C. Veljanovski

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引用次数: 1

摘要

摘要绿色反垄断的理由是软弱和有缺陷的。它在很大程度上是抽象的、假设的、法律的、有点情绪化的，并且缺乏支持性的证据。其支持者声称，欧盟委员会对TFEU第101条的强制执行阻碍了行业为提高可持续性而发起的高效合作。但正如所表明的那样，这种更宽松的方法将导致市场力量的增强、超竞争力的价格和更大的行业利润，而且不太可能实现比竞争更大的绿色技术投资和更快的采用。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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The case against green antitrust

ABSTRACT The case for a greener antitrust is weak and flawed. It is largely abstract, hypothetical, legalistic, somewhat emotive and lacks supporting evidence. Its proponents claim that the European Commission’s enforcement of Article 101 TFEU blocks efficient industry-initiated cooperation to improve sustainability. But as is shown, this more permissive approach will lead to increased market power, supra-competitive prices and greater industry profits, and is unlikely to achieve greater investment in and the faster adoption of green technologies than competition.

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来源期刊

European Competition Journal Social Sciences-Law

CiteScore

1.50

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The European Competition Journal publishes outstanding scholarly articles relating to European competition law and economics. Its mission is to help foster learning and debate about how European competition law and policy can continue to develop in an economically rational way. Articles published in the Journal are subject to rigorous peer review by leading experts from around Europe. Topics include: -Vertical and Conglomerate Mergers -Enlargement of the Union - the ramifications for Competition Policy -Unilateral and Coordinated Effects in Merger Control -Modernisation of European Competition law -Cartels and Leniency.