{"title":"喧闹比赛中的出价上限","authors":"Qiang Fu, Zenan Wu, Yuxuan Zhu","doi":"10.1257/mic.20220046","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper studies optimal bid caps in a multiplayer noisy contest in which a higher bid does not guarantee a sure win. The bid cap can be either rigid or flexible. The former imposes outright bidding restrictions on players’ bids, while the latter taxes bids. A designer structures the bid cap to maximize a weighted sum between aggregate bid and tax revenue. Our analysis characterizes the optimum. A rigid bid is always outperformed by flexible ones, and a laissez-faire policy—i.e., no cap—is optimal when the designer maximizes the aggregate bid. The results also generate novel practical implications. (JEL C72, D44, D82)","PeriodicalId":47467,"journal":{"name":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","volume":" ","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":2.2000,"publicationDate":"2023-08-01","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"3","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Bid Caps in Noisy Contests\",\"authors\":\"Qiang Fu, Zenan Wu, Yuxuan Zhu\",\"doi\":\"10.1257/mic.20220046\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper studies optimal bid caps in a multiplayer noisy contest in which a higher bid does not guarantee a sure win. The bid cap can be either rigid or flexible. The former imposes outright bidding restrictions on players’ bids, while the latter taxes bids. A designer structures the bid cap to maximize a weighted sum between aggregate bid and tax revenue. Our analysis characterizes the optimum. A rigid bid is always outperformed by flexible ones, and a laissez-faire policy—i.e., no cap—is optimal when the designer maximizes the aggregate bid. The results also generate novel practical implications. (JEL C72, D44, D82)\",\"PeriodicalId\":47467,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics\",\"volume\":\" \",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.2000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-08-01\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"3\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20220046\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q2\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"American Economic Journal-Microeconomics","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20220046","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q2","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}
This paper studies optimal bid caps in a multiplayer noisy contest in which a higher bid does not guarantee a sure win. The bid cap can be either rigid or flexible. The former imposes outright bidding restrictions on players’ bids, while the latter taxes bids. A designer structures the bid cap to maximize a weighted sum between aggregate bid and tax revenue. Our analysis characterizes the optimum. A rigid bid is always outperformed by flexible ones, and a laissez-faire policy—i.e., no cap—is optimal when the designer maximizes the aggregate bid. The results also generate novel practical implications. (JEL C72, D44, D82)
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