讨价还价中的策略不确定性厌恶——实验证据

IF 2.5 2区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Journal of Economic Psychology Pub Date : 2023-03-01 DOI:10.1016/j.joep.2023.102604

Ben Greiner

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引用次数: 3

摘要

在一系列的四个实验中，我证明了在非常简单的议价博弈中，存在对基本不存在的战略不确定性的显著厌恶。这种厌恶远远超出了普通的风险或模糊性厌恶。具体来说，尽管在讨价还价博弈中几乎没有人期望或选择拒绝平均分配，但参与者表现得好像平均分配会有相当大的拒绝率。这种行为在实验设计和实验对象池中都是稳健的，可能导致市场效率低下，并且与策略和理性信念的一致性不相容。

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Strategic uncertainty aversion in bargaining — Experimental evidence

In a series of four experiments I demonstrate the existence of significant aversion to basically non-existent strategic uncertainty in very simple bargaining games. This aversion goes far beyond ordinary risk or ambiguity aversion. Specifically, although almost nobody expects or chooses the rejection of an offered equal split in a bargaining game, participants behave as if there would be a considerably large rejection rate for equal splits. This behavior is robust across experimental designs and subject pools, can lead to inefficiencies in markets, and is incompatible with consistency of strategies and rational beliefs.

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来源期刊

Journal of Economic Psychology Multiple-

CiteScore

5.20

自引率

31.40%

发文量

审稿时长

63 days

期刊介绍： The Journal aims to present research that will improve understanding of behavioral, in particular psychological, aspects of economic phenomena and processes. The Journal seeks to be a channel for the increased interest in using behavioral science methods for the study of economic behavior, and so to contribute to better solutions of societal problems, by stimulating new approaches and new theorizing about economic affairs. Economic psychology as a discipline studies the psychological mechanisms that underlie economic behavior. It deals with preferences, judgments, choices, economic interaction, and factors influencing these, as well as the consequences of judgements and decisions for economic processes and phenomena. This includes the impact of economic institutions upon human behavior and well-being. Studies in economic psychology may relate to different levels of aggregation, from the household and the individual consumer to the macro level of whole nations. Economic behavior in connection with inflation, unemployment, taxation, economic development, as well as consumer information and economic behavior in the market place are thus among the fields of interest. The journal also encourages submissions dealing with social interaction in economic contexts, like bargaining, negotiation, or group decision-making. The Journal of Economic Psychology contains: (a) novel reports of empirical (including: experimental) research on economic behavior; (b) replications studies; (c) assessments of the state of the art in economic psychology; (d) articles providing a theoretical perspective or a frame of reference for the study of economic behavior; (e) articles explaining the implications of theoretical developments for practical applications; (f) book reviews; (g) announcements of meetings, conferences and seminars.