The Devil’s in the Differences: Ukraine and a Taiwan Contingency

When and if a Taiwan contingency were to ever unfold, there is likely to be a natural tendency to refer to the Ukraine experience as a reference from which to draw strategic lessons. While there are some structural similarities between the Ukraine war and some future Taiwan scenario—and certain preferences and courses of action may look familiar—attention ought to be more focused on areas in which they diverge. Drawing on US economic statecraft responses to the Russian invasion of Ukraine, I suggest that a Taiwan contingency may prove more challenging, and that parts of the US government should proactively take measures today to enhance our position in any future conflict involving Taiwan. Across the more than 30 departments and agencies in the US government that are responsible for some element of economic statecraft, there is a pressing institutional need to engage in economic statecraft capacity building. Economic statecraft takes on a wide variety of forms well beyond sanctions. We need to improve both our understanding of economic statecraft as well as our institutional capacity to wield this important tool of national power. The time to do that is now, not in the middle of an acute crisis.