The (universal) human and beyond: constituting security objects in theory and practice

ABSTRACT This paper addresses an analytical gap in critical security studies related to the social construction, legitimation, and institutionalisation of referents objects, or the ‘for whom’ of security. As it lays out, referent objects tend to be assessed based on pre-theoretical commitments that themselves fall outside of the scope of critical security analysis. This has important analytical and ethical consequences, which I heuristically illustrate in relation to ‘the individual’ in both Copenhagen School securitisation theory and human-centred security. In one case, the individual is understood as an atomised Hobbesian figure at odds with the collective, and in the other, as a socially embedded figure representative of humanity. Incommensurate ontological baselines have on the one hand stymied fruitful dialogue between these two influential approaches. More importantly, however, fixed perspectives on ‘the individual’ have also served to limit each approach’s purview, even on their own terms. In highlighting the value of de-naturalising ‘the individual,’ I lay out a broader argument for problematising referent objects more generally, as a more productive way of thinking about security that moves the conversation beyond practically endless articulations of potential danger. Overall, I argue that the intersubjective processes by which any referent object is constituted as a legitimate claimant to security, is as central to the critical study and ethical practice of security, as that of putative threats to it.