{"title":"工作场所民主、两院制企业和利益相关者理论","authors":"M. Fleurbaey","doi":"10.1177/00323292231163700","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"Ferreras's bicameral governance proposal for the corporation contributes to a recent wave of interest in democratizing the workplace. In this article, I connect this to a related ongoing movement in favor of the stakeholder approach to corporate purpose. I argue that this connection sheds light on, and may provide remedies for, some issues with the bicameral proposal: first, the risk of gridlock between the two parties in the dual governance structure; second, the indeterminacy of good management when shareholder primacy is abandoned. But I also note that shareholder primacy emerged spontaneously from structural features of the economy, so that special protection for the “good” firms is warranted, and that other key limitations of a market economy cannot be alleviated fully by democratizing the firm.","PeriodicalId":47847,"journal":{"name":"Politics & Society","volume":null,"pages":null},"PeriodicalIF":4.1000,"publicationDate":"2023-04-18","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"1","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"Workplace Democracy, the Bicameral Firm, and Stakeholder Theory\",\"authors\":\"M. Fleurbaey\",\"doi\":\"10.1177/00323292231163700\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"Ferreras's bicameral governance proposal for the corporation contributes to a recent wave of interest in democratizing the workplace. In this article, I connect this to a related ongoing movement in favor of the stakeholder approach to corporate purpose. I argue that this connection sheds light on, and may provide remedies for, some issues with the bicameral proposal: first, the risk of gridlock between the two parties in the dual governance structure; second, the indeterminacy of good management when shareholder primacy is abandoned. But I also note that shareholder primacy emerged spontaneously from structural features of the economy, so that special protection for the “good” firms is warranted, and that other key limitations of a market economy cannot be alleviated fully by democratizing the firm.\",\"PeriodicalId\":47847,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Politics & Society\",\"volume\":null,\"pages\":null},\"PeriodicalIF\":4.1000,\"publicationDate\":\"2023-04-18\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"1\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Politics & Society\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"90\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292231163700\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"社会学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"POLITICAL SCIENCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Politics & Society","FirstCategoryId":"90","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1177/00323292231163700","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"社会学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"POLITICAL SCIENCE","Score":null,"Total":0}
Workplace Democracy, the Bicameral Firm, and Stakeholder Theory
Ferreras's bicameral governance proposal for the corporation contributes to a recent wave of interest in democratizing the workplace. In this article, I connect this to a related ongoing movement in favor of the stakeholder approach to corporate purpose. I argue that this connection sheds light on, and may provide remedies for, some issues with the bicameral proposal: first, the risk of gridlock between the two parties in the dual governance structure; second, the indeterminacy of good management when shareholder primacy is abandoned. But I also note that shareholder primacy emerged spontaneously from structural features of the economy, so that special protection for the “good” firms is warranted, and that other key limitations of a market economy cannot be alleviated fully by democratizing the firm.
期刊介绍:
Politics & Society is a peer-reviewed journal. All submitted papers are read by a rotating editorial board member. If a paper is deemed potentially publishable, it is sent to another board member, who, if agreeing that it is potentially publishable, sends it to a third board member. If and only if all three agree, the paper is sent to the entire editorial board for consideration at board meetings. The editorial board meets three times a year, and the board members who are present (usually between 9 and 14) make decisions through a deliberative process that also considers written reports from absent members. Unlike many journals which rely on 1–3 individual blind referee reports and a single editor with final say, the peers who decide whether to accept submitted work are thus the full editorial board of the journal, comprised of scholars from various disciplines, who discuss papers openly, with author names known, at meetings. Editors are required to disclose potential conflicts of interest when evaluating manuscripts and to recuse themselves from voting if such a potential exists.