有出价上限和随机进入的全包拍卖中的披露政策：风险规避的影响

IF 0.8 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Bulletin of Economic Research Pub Date : 2023-04-28 DOI:10.1111/boer.12398

Xiangyu Wang, Shulin Liu

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们研究了风险厌恶如何影响组织者在外生出价上限和随机入场的全付拍卖中披露投标人的实际数量。由于存在外生参与概率，当投标人为风险中性时，组织者倾向于完全隐藏参与投标人的数量。然而，这一结果并不适用于风险厌恶。具体来说，组织者是倾向于完全隐藏信息还是完全披露信息，这取决于潜在投标人的数量、参与的概率和出价上限的大小。内生进入的特殊情况表明，组织者的偏好与风险中性情况相似。

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Disclosure policies in all-pay auctions with bid caps and stochastic entry: The impact of risk aversion

We investigate how risk aversion affects the organizer's disclosing the actual number of bidders in an all-pay auction with an exogenous bid cap and stochastic entry. With an exogenous probability of participation, the organizer prefers fully concealing the number of participating bidders when bidders are risk neutral. However, this result does not hold with risk aversion. Specifically, whether the organizer prefers fully concealing or fully revealing information depends on the number of potential bidders, the probability of participation, and the size of bid caps. A special case of endogenous entry shows that the organizer's preference is similar to the risk-neutral case.

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来源期刊

Bulletin of Economic Research ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.40

自引率

0.00%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Bulletin of Economic Research is an international journal publishing articles across the entire field of economics, econometrics and economic history. The Bulletin contains original theoretical, applied and empirical work which makes a substantial contribution to the subject and is of broad interest to economists. We welcome submissions in all fields and, with the Bulletin expanding in new areas, we particularly encourage submissions in the fields of experimental economics, financial econometrics and health economics. In addition to full-length articles the Bulletin publishes refereed shorter articles, notes and comments; authoritative survey articles in all areas of economics and special themed issues.