彩票比赛的配对

IF 0.6 Q4 ECONOMICS

Games Pub Date : 2022-09-29 DOI:10.3390/g13050064

Chen Cohen, Ishay Rabi, A. Sela

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引用次数: 1

摘要

我们研究了有两个集合A和B的双边匹配竞赛，每个集合都包含有限数量的具有已知类型的异构智能体。每个集合中的智能体通过抽奖(Tullock)竞赛进行竞争，然后进行分类匹配，即集合a的赢家与集合B的赢家进行匹配，以此类推，直到集合中拥有较少数量智能体的所有智能体都匹配完成。每个代理都有一个匹配值，这取决于它们自己的类型和它们匹配的类型。我们假设代理人的努力不影响他们的匹配值，并且他们对福利有积极的影响。因此，至少有一些主体是活跃的内部均衡比那些主体选择不活跃的角落均衡更有福利。我们分析了存在(部分)内部均衡的条件，其中至少有一些代理相互竞争并发挥积极的努力。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Assortative Matching by Lottery Contests

We study two-sided matching contests with two sets, A and B, each of which includes a finite number of heterogeneous agents with commonly known types. The agents in each set compete in a lottery (Tullock) contest, and then are assortatively matched, namely, the winner of set A is matched with the winner of set B and so on until all the agents in the set with the smaller number of agents are matched. Each agent has a match value that depends on their own type and the type of their match. We assume that the agents’ efforts do not affect their match values and that they have a positive effect on welfare. Therefore, an interior equilibrium in which at least some of the agents are active is welfare superior to a corner equilibrium in which the agents choose to be non-active. We analyze the conditions under which there exists a (partial) interior equilibrium where at least some of the agents compete against each other and exert positive efforts.

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来源期刊

Games Decision Sciences-Statistics, Probability and Uncertainty

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

11.10%

发文量

审稿时长

11 weeks

期刊介绍： Games (ISSN 2073-4336) is an international, peer-reviewed, quick-refereeing open access journal (free for readers), which provides an advanced forum for studies related to strategic interaction, game theory and its applications, and decision making. The aim is to provide an interdisciplinary forum for all behavioral sciences and related fields, including economics, psychology, political science, mathematics, computer science, and biology (including animal behavior). To guarantee a rapid refereeing and editorial process, Games follows standard publication practices in the natural sciences.