小公司行贿更多吗?非洲的公司规模、非正式支付和缓解策略

IF 1.2 Q4 MANAGEMENT

Africa Journal of Management Pub Date : 2023-04-03 DOI:10.1080/23322373.2023.2187685

G. Acheampong, John Rand

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引用次数: 0

摘要

摘要在本文中，我们试图了解企业规模对非洲企业索贿和行贿的影响，以及克服这些影响所需的策略。我们认为，规模代表了企业向腐败需求屈服的选择性压力，而从组织的适应性角度来看的战略（正式化时间、关系强度和外国参与）是应对这些压力的工具。我们使用世界银行非洲企业调查的数据来测试我们的框架。我们发现，小规模效应的责任是存在的，因为一家公司获得的贿赂越大，就向腐败的公职人员支付的百分比而言就越少。我们还发现，正式化的时间、关系强度和外国参与是这种影响的重要调节因素。这项研究通过测试一个整合了选择主义和适应性组织观的偶然框架做出了贡献。

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Do smaller businesses pay more bribes? Firm size, informal payments and mitigating strategies in Africa

ABSTRACT In this paper, we sought to understand the effect of firm size on demand for and payment of bribes by African firms and the strategies needed to overcome them. We argued that size represents a selectionist pressure on firms to cede to corrupt demands while strategies (time to formalization, relational intensity and foreign participation) from the adaptive perspective of the organization are tools to deal with these pressures. We test our framework using data from the World Bank Enterprise Surveys in Africa. We find that the liability of smallness effect exists as the larger a firm gets the fewer bribes in percentage terms it pays out to corrupt public officials. We find also that time to formalization, relational intensity and foreign participation are significant moderators of this effect. The study makes a contribution by testing a contingent framework that integrates the selectionist and adaptive views of organizing.

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来源期刊

Africa Journal of Management Business, Management and Accounting-Business and International Management

CiteScore

2.80

自引率

15.40%

发文量

期刊介绍： The beginning of the Twenty First Century has witnessed Africa’s rise and progress as one of the fastest growing and most promising regions of the world. At the same time, serious challenges remain. To sustain and speed up momentum, avoid reversal, and deal effectively with emerging challenges and opportunities, Africa needs better management scholarship, education and practice. The purpose of the Africa Journal of Management (AJOM) is to advance management theory, research, education, practice and service in Africa by promoting the production and dissemination of high quality and relevant manuscripts. AJOM is committed to publishing original, rigorous, scholarly empirical and theoretical research papers, which demonstrate clear understanding of the management literature and draw on Africa’s local indigenous knowledge, wisdom and current realities. As the first scholarly journal of the Africa Academy of Management (AFAM), AJOM gives voice to all those who are committed to advancing management scholarship, education and practice in or about Africa, for the benefit of all of Africa. AJOM welcomes manuscripts that develop, test, replicate or validate management theories, tools and methods with Africa as the starting point. The journal is open to a wide range of quality, evidence-based methodological approaches and methods that “link” “Western” management theories with Africa’s indigenous knowledge systems, methods and practice. We are particularly interested in manuscripts which address Africa’s most important development needs, challenges and opportunities as well as the big management questions of the day. We are interested in research papers which address issues of ethical conduct in different African settings.