社会选择功能框架下的权力选民和操纵的分类

IF 0.5 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Social Choice and Welfare Pub Date : 2023-02-06 DOI:10.1007/s00355-022-01448-w

Amílcar Mata Díaz, Ramón Pino Pérez, Jahn Franklin Leal

引用次数: 0

摘要

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

Taxonomy of powerful voters and manipulation in the framework of social choice functions

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Taxonomy of powerful voters and manipulation in the framework of social choice functions

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来源期刊

Social Choice and Welfare Multiple-

CiteScore

1.60

自引率

11.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： Social Choice and Welfare explores all aspects, both normative and positive, of welfare economics, collective choice, and strategic interaction. Topics include but are not limited to: preference aggregation, welfare criteria, fairness, justice and equity, rights, inequality and poverty measurement, voting and elections, political games, coalition formation, public goods, mechanism design, networks, matching, optimal taxation, cost-benefit analysis, computational social choice, judgement aggregation, market design, behavioral welfare economics, subjective well-being studies and experimental investigations related to social choice and voting. As such, the journal is inter-disciplinary and cuts across the boundaries of economics, political science, philosophy, and mathematics. Articles on choice and order theory that include results that can be applied to the above topics are also included in the journal. While it emphasizes theory, the journal also publishes empirical work in the subject area reflecting cross-fertilizing between theoretical and empirical research. Readers will find original research articles, surveys, and book reviews.Officially cited as: Soc Choice Welf