医疗保健服务支付的经济分析:美国和瑞士的比较。

Peter Zweifel, Ming Tai-Seale
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引用次数: 10

摘要

本文旨在评估美国和瑞士的医生支付改革是否有可能实现其目标。我们首先介绍基本契约理论,组织原则是患者和医疗保健提供者之间的信息不对称程度。根据信息不对称的程度,不同的支付方式会诱发“适当”行为。然后将这些理论结果与美国的RBRVS进行比较,发现其许多方面都不是最优的。然后我们转向瑞士的Tarmed,发现它也不符合经济契约理论的处方。文章最后对可能的改革进行了回顾,这些改革可以取消统一的收费时间表,以改善医疗保健系统的绩效。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。
An economic analysis of payment for health care services: the United States and Switzerland compared.

This article seeks to assess whether physician payment reforms in the United States and Switzerland were likely to attain their objectives. We first introduce basic contract theory, with the organizing principle being the degree of information asymmetry between the patient and the health care provider. Depending on the degree of information asymmetry, different forms of payment induce "appropriate" behavior. These theoretical results are then pitted against the RBRVS of the United States to find that a number of its aspects are not optimal. We then turn to Switzerland's Tarmed and find that it fails to conform with the prescriptions of economic contract theory as well. The article closes with a review of possible reforms that could do away with uniform fee schedules to improve the performance of the health care system.

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