薪酬激励、管理层过度自信与薪酬政策

IF 7.4 2区经济学 Q1 BUSINESS, FINANCE

Finance Research Letters Pub Date : 2025-07-11 DOI:10.1016/j.frl.2025.107961

Artem Anilov, Irina Ivashkovskaya

{"title":"薪酬激励、管理层过度自信与薪酬政策","authors":"Artem Anilov, Irina Ivashkovskaya","doi":"10.1016/j.frl.2025.107961","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"This paper investigates how CEO overconfidence interacts with compensation structure to influence corporate payout policy. Using a panel of 713 S&P 1500 firms from 2010 to 2019, we find that overconfident CEOs with higher equity-based (i.e., convex) compensation are associated with significantly lower levels of both cash dividends and share repurchases. In contrast, inside debt compensation (non-convex) mitigates this effect, encouraging higher dividend payouts. The results suggest that these effects operate through financial slack and risk-taking channels. The uncovered relationships are present only in firms operating in non-innovative industries and with strong corporate governance. We interpret this as evidence that boards in innovative firms preserve managerial discretion, while weak governance limits the board’s ability to discipline overconfident CEOs. Our findings are robust to alternative measures of overconfidence and endogeneity controls. These results highlight the importance of tailoring CEO incentives to behavioral traits such as overconfidence, particularly in relation to payout decisions.","PeriodicalId":12167,"journal":{"name":"Finance Research Letters","volume":"50 1","pages":""},"PeriodicalIF":7.4000,"publicationDate":"2025-07-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"On Compensation Incentives, Managerial Overconfidence, And Payout Policy\",\"authors\":\"Artem Anilov, Irina Ivashkovskaya\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.frl.2025.107961\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"This paper investigates how CEO overconfidence interacts with compensation structure to influence corporate payout policy. Using a panel of 713 S&P 1500 firms from 2010 to 2019, we find that overconfident CEOs with higher equity-based (i.e., convex) compensation are associated with significantly lower levels of both cash dividends and share repurchases. In contrast, inside debt compensation (non-convex) mitigates this effect, encouraging higher dividend payouts. The results suggest that these effects operate through financial slack and risk-taking channels. The uncovered relationships are present only in firms operating in non-innovative industries and with strong corporate governance. We interpret this as evidence that boards in innovative firms preserve managerial discretion, while weak governance limits the board’s ability to discipline overconfident CEOs. Our findings are robust to alternative measures of overconfidence and endogeneity controls. These results highlight the importance of tailoring CEO incentives to behavioral traits such as overconfidence, particularly in relation to payout decisions.\",\"PeriodicalId\":12167,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"Finance Research Letters\",\"volume\":\"50 1\",\"pages\":\"\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":7.4000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-07-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"Finance Research Letters\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2025.107961\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"BUSINESS, FINANCE\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"Finance Research Letters","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://doi.org/10.1016/j.frl.2025.107961","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"BUSINESS, FINANCE","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

本文研究了CEO过度自信如何与薪酬结构相互作用，从而影响公司的薪酬政策。通过对2010年至2019年713家标准普尔1500指数公司的调查，我们发现，过于自信的ceo，其基于股权的薪酬（即凸型薪酬）较高，其现金股息和股票回购水平均显著较低。相比之下，内部债务补偿（非凸）减轻了这种影响，鼓励了更高的股息支付。结果表明，这些影响通过金融宽松和风险承担渠道发挥作用。未发现的关系仅存在于非创新型行业和公司治理较强的公司中。我们将此解释为创新公司的董事会保留了管理自由裁量权的证据，而治理不力限制了董事会约束过度自信的首席执行官的能力。我们的研究结果对于过度自信和内生性控制的替代措施是稳健的。这些结果强调了根据过度自信等行为特征（尤其是与薪酬决定有关的行为特征）调整CEO激励措施的重要性。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

On Compensation Incentives, Managerial Overconfidence, And Payout Policy

This paper investigates how CEO overconfidence interacts with compensation structure to influence corporate payout policy. Using a panel of 713 S&P 1500 firms from 2010 to 2019, we find that overconfident CEOs with higher equity-based (i.e., convex) compensation are associated with significantly lower levels of both cash dividends and share repurchases. In contrast, inside debt compensation (non-convex) mitigates this effect, encouraging higher dividend payouts. The results suggest that these effects operate through financial slack and risk-taking channels. The uncovered relationships are present only in firms operating in non-innovative industries and with strong corporate governance. We interpret this as evidence that boards in innovative firms preserve managerial discretion, while weak governance limits the board’s ability to discipline overconfident CEOs. Our findings are robust to alternative measures of overconfidence and endogeneity controls. These results highlight the importance of tailoring CEO incentives to behavioral traits such as overconfidence, particularly in relation to payout decisions.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

Finance Research Letters BUSINESS, FINANCE-

CiteScore

11.10

自引率

14.40%

发文量

863

期刊介绍： Finance Research Letters welcomes submissions across all areas of finance, aiming for rapid publication of significant new findings. The journal particularly encourages papers that provide insight into the replicability of established results, examine the cross-national applicability of previous findings, challenge existing methodologies, or demonstrate methodological contingencies. Papers are invited in the following areas: Actuarial studies Alternative investments Asset Pricing Bankruptcy and liquidation Banks and other Depository Institutions Behavioral and experimental finance Bibliometric and Scientometric studies of finance Capital budgeting and corporate investment Capital markets and accounting Capital structure and payout policy Commodities Contagion, crises and interdependence Corporate governance Credit and fixed income markets and instruments Derivatives Emerging markets Energy Finance and Energy Markets Financial Econometrics Financial History Financial intermediation and money markets Financial markets and marketplaces Financial Mathematics and Econophysics Financial Regulation and Law Forecasting Frontier market studies International Finance Market efficiency, event studies Mergers, acquisitions and the market for corporate control Micro Finance Institutions Microstructure Non-bank Financial Institutions Personal Finance Portfolio choice and investing Real estate finance and investing Risk SME, Family and Entrepreneurial Finance