付出更少的努力：关于信息回避、乐观信念和绩效

IF 2.8 2区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

European Economic Review Pub Date : 2025-02-11 DOI:10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.104965

Steffen Huck , Nora Szech , Lukas M. Wenner

{"title":"付出更少的努力：关于信息回避、乐观信念和绩效","authors":"Steffen Huck , Nora Szech , Lukas M. Wenner","doi":"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.104965","DOIUrl":null,"url":null,"abstract":"<div><div>Neoclassical theory presumes that agents value instrumental information. In contrast, recent behavioral studies motivate and model information avoidance. We study preferences for and against instrumental information in a real-effort task varying information structures on performance pay. Our study offers three main results. First, we confirm that both, preferences for and against instrumental information, exist. Second, information avoiders outperform information receivers. This result holds independently of effects of self-selection. Third, our findings about information avoiders can be aligned with behavioral theories of optimistic belief design.</div></div>","PeriodicalId":48389,"journal":{"name":"European Economic Review","volume":"174 ","pages":"Article 104965"},"PeriodicalIF":2.8000,"publicationDate":"2025-02-11","publicationTypes":"Journal Article","fieldsOfStudy":null,"isOpenAccess":false,"openAccessPdf":"","citationCount":"0","resultStr":"{\"title\":\"More effort with less pay: On information avoidance, optimistic beliefs, and performance\",\"authors\":\"Steffen Huck , Nora Szech , Lukas M. Wenner\",\"doi\":\"10.1016/j.euroecorev.2025.104965\",\"DOIUrl\":null,\"url\":null,\"abstract\":\"<div><div>Neoclassical theory presumes that agents value instrumental information. In contrast, recent behavioral studies motivate and model information avoidance. We study preferences for and against instrumental information in a real-effort task varying information structures on performance pay. Our study offers three main results. First, we confirm that both, preferences for and against instrumental information, exist. Second, information avoiders outperform information receivers. This result holds independently of effects of self-selection. Third, our findings about information avoiders can be aligned with behavioral theories of optimistic belief design.</div></div>\",\"PeriodicalId\":48389,\"journal\":{\"name\":\"European Economic Review\",\"volume\":\"174 \",\"pages\":\"Article 104965\"},\"PeriodicalIF\":2.8000,\"publicationDate\":\"2025-02-11\",\"publicationTypes\":\"Journal Article\",\"fieldsOfStudy\":null,\"isOpenAccess\":false,\"openAccessPdf\":\"\",\"citationCount\":\"0\",\"resultStr\":null,\"platform\":\"Semanticscholar\",\"paperid\":null,\"PeriodicalName\":\"European Economic Review\",\"FirstCategoryId\":\"96\",\"ListUrlMain\":\"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292125000157\",\"RegionNum\":2,\"RegionCategory\":\"经济学\",\"ArticlePicture\":[],\"TitleCN\":null,\"AbstractTextCN\":null,\"PMCID\":null,\"EPubDate\":\"\",\"PubModel\":\"\",\"JCR\":\"Q1\",\"JCRName\":\"ECONOMICS\",\"Score\":null,\"Total\":0}","platform":"Semanticscholar","paperid":null,"PeriodicalName":"European Economic Review","FirstCategoryId":"96","ListUrlMain":"https://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0014292125000157","RegionNum":2,"RegionCategory":"经济学","ArticlePicture":[],"TitleCN":null,"AbstractTextCN":null,"PMCID":null,"EPubDate":"","PubModel":"","JCR":"Q1","JCRName":"ECONOMICS","Score":null,"Total":0}

引用次数: 0

摘要

新古典主义理论假定代理人重视工具性信息。相比之下，最近的行为研究激发并模拟了信息回避。我们研究了在实际工作任务中对工具信息的偏好和对工具信息的偏好，这些信息结构与绩效薪酬有关。我们的研究提供了三个主要结果。首先，我们确认对工具信息的偏好和对工具信息的偏好都存在。其次，信息回避者的表现优于信息接受者。这一结果独立于自我选择的影响。第三，信息回避者的研究结果与乐观信念设计的行为理论是一致的。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

查看原文本刊更多论文

More effort with less pay: On information avoidance, optimistic beliefs, and performance

Neoclassical theory presumes that agents value instrumental information. In contrast, recent behavioral studies motivate and model information avoidance. We study preferences for and against instrumental information in a real-effort task varying information structures on performance pay. Our study offers three main results. First, we confirm that both, preferences for and against instrumental information, exist. Second, information avoiders outperform information receivers. This result holds independently of effects of self-selection. Third, our findings about information avoiders can be aligned with behavioral theories of optimistic belief design.

求助全文

通过发布文献求助，成功后即可免费获取论文全文。去求助

来源期刊

European Economic Review ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

4.70

自引率

3.60%

发文量

170

期刊介绍： The European Economic Review (EER) started publishing in 1969 as the first research journal specifically aiming to contribute to the development and application of economics as a science in Europe. As a broad-based professional and international journal, the EER welcomes submissions of applied and theoretical research papers in all fields of economics. The aim of the EER is to contribute to the development of the science of economics and its applications, as well as to improve communication between academic researchers, teachers and policy makers across the European continent and beyond.