论信息共享游戏的核心

IF 0.8 4区管理学 Q4 OPERATIONS RESEARCH & MANAGEMENT SCIENCE

Operations Research Letters Pub Date : 2025-01-27 DOI:10.1016/j.orl.2025.107247

Yasuo Sasaki

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在合作博弈方法中，信息共享博弈处理的是由信息共享产生的收益分配问题。在本研究中，我们预设了这些博弈的核心的几个属性，例如单个核心的必要和充分条件以及代理在核心中的最大收益的简单计算。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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On the core of information sharing games

Information sharing games deal with allocating payoffs created by information sharing among agents in the cooperative-game approach. In this study, we preset several properties of the core of those games, such as a necessary and sufficient condition for the singleton core and simple computation of an agent's maximum payoff in the core.

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来源期刊

Operations Research Letters 管理科学-运筹学与管理科学

CiteScore

2.10

自引率

9.10%

发文量

111

审稿时长

83 days

期刊介绍： Operations Research Letters is committed to the rapid review and fast publication of short articles on all aspects of operations research and analytics. Apart from a limitation to eight journal pages, quality, originality, relevance and clarity are the only criteria for selecting the papers to be published. ORL covers the broad field of optimization, stochastic models and game theory. Specific areas of interest include networks, routing, location, queueing, scheduling, inventory, reliability, and financial engineering. We wish to explore interfaces with other fields such as life sciences and health care, artificial intelligence and machine learning, energy distribution, and computational social sciences and humanities. Our traditional strength is in methodology, including theory, modelling, algorithms and computational studies. We also welcome novel applications and concise literature reviews.