中国政府采购中的地方偏袒：信息摩擦还是激励扭曲？

IF 5.7 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

Journal of Urban Economics Pub Date : 2024-11-16 DOI:10.1016/j.jue.2024.103716

Wei TANG , Yuan WANG , Jiameng WU

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引用次数: 0

摘要

本文旨在厘清信息摩擦和地方官员职业激励在政府合同分配中的作用。利用包括中国公共采购拍卖中的中标者和落标者在内的独特数据集，我们记录了合同分配中强烈的地方偏差。这些模式很难与根植于信息摩擦或腐败的解释相协调。相反，我们强调了地方领导人职业激励机制的作用，并提出证据表明，在市长激励机制较强的地方，地方偏好更为明显。我们的发现促使人们重新考虑官僚自由裁量权在公共资源分配中的有效性。(JEL H57, H77, H72, D73, R51)

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Local favoritism in China's public procurement: Information frictions or incentive distortion?

This paper aims to disentangle the roles of information frictions and career incentives of local officials in the allocation of government contracts. Drawing on a unique dataset including both winning and losing bidders of public procurement auctions in China, we document a strong local bias in the contract allocation. These patterns are hardly reconciled with explanations rooted in information frictions or corruption. Instead, we highlight the role of local leaders’ career incentives, presenting evidence that local favoritism is more pronounced in localities with more incentivized mayors. Our findings prompt a reconsideration of the effectiveness of bureaucratic discretion in allocating public resources. (JEL H57, H77, H72, D73, R51)

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来源期刊

Journal of Urban Economics Multiple-

CiteScore

10.60

自引率

4.80%

发文量

期刊介绍： The Journal of Urban Economics provides a focal point for the publication of research papers in the rapidly expanding field of urban economics. It publishes papers of great scholarly merit on a wide range of topics and employing a wide range of approaches to urban economics. The Journal welcomes papers that are theoretical or empirical, positive or normative. Although the Journal is not intended to be multidisciplinary, papers by noneconomists are welcome if they are of interest to economists. Brief Notes are also published if they lie within the purview of the Journal and if they contain new information, comment on published work, or new theoretical suggestions.