极弱优势战略

IF 0.5 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-09-18 DOI:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.005

Benjamin Bachi, Shiran Rachmilevitch

引用次数: 0

摘要

我们为 n 人策略博弈引入了一个新的解概念--极弱优势，它比普通的弱优势弱，但比纳什均衡强。这个概念的一个吸引人的特点是，它可以为存在弱支配策略的博弈提供直观的预测，但这些策略似乎并不吸引人。

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Very weakly dominant strategies

We introduce a new solution concept for

n

-person strategic games — very weak dominance — which is weaker than ordinary weak dominance, but stronger than Nash equilibrium. One of the attractive features of this concept is that it can provide intuitive predictions to games in which weakly dominant strategies exist, but they seem unappealing.

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来源期刊

Mathematical Social Sciences 数学-数学跨学科应用

CiteScore

1.30

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

59 days

期刊介绍： The international, interdisciplinary journal Mathematical Social Sciences publishes original research articles, survey papers, short notes and book reviews. The journal emphasizes the unity of mathematical modelling in economics, psychology, political sciences, sociology and other social sciences. Topics of particular interest include the fundamental aspects of choice, information, and preferences (decision science) and of interaction (game theory and economic theory), the measurement of utility, welfare and inequality, the formal theories of justice and implementation, voting rules, cooperative games, fair division, cost allocation, bargaining, matching, social networks, and evolutionary and other dynamics models. Papers published by the journal are mathematically rigorous but no bounds, from above or from below, limits their technical level. All mathematical techniques may be used. The articles should be self-contained and readable by social scientists trained in mathematics.