生产性和破坏性群体竞赛：实验研究

IF 2.2 1区社会学 Q1 INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS

Journal of Conflict Resolution Pub Date : 2024-10-15 DOI:10.1177/00220027241290770

Guillaume Cheikbossian, Julie Rosaz

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在本研究中，我们通过实验检验了奖品价值固定和内生决定时群体间竞赛博弈的理论结果。在武装冲突或诉讼的情况下，奖品的价值会随着所有群体的竞争努力而降低。奖品的价值也可能随着竞争努力的增加而增加，如专利竞赛。我们还分析了不同参与者分组对竞争努力的影响。无论奖品价值是外生的还是内生的，我们都观察到了过度投资的现象，而且小组规模没有负面影响。此外，高产竞赛似乎对个人投资没有积极影响。然而，破坏性竞赛确实会产生显著的负面影响，但这种影响会随着竞争小组数量的增加而减弱。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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Productive and Destructive Group Contests: An Experimental Investigation

In this study, we experimentally test the theoretical results of a contest game between groups when the value of the prize is fixed and when it is endogenously determined. It can decrease with contest efforts of all groups as in the case of an armed conflict or a lawsuit. The value of the prize can also increase with contest efforts as in the case of a patent race. We also analyze the impact of different groupings of players on contest efforts. We observe overinvestment and no negative effect of group size whether the prize value is exogenous or endogenous. Also, a productive contest seems to have no positive effect on individual investments. A destructive contest, however, does have a significant negative impact, but this effect is reduced with a larger number of competing groups.

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来源期刊

Journal of Conflict Resolution Multiple-

CiteScore

5.30

自引率

9.70%

发文量

101

期刊介绍： The Journal of Conflict Resolution is an interdisciplinary journal of social scientific theory and research on human conflict. It focuses especially on international conflict, but its pages are open to a variety of contributions about intergroup conflict, as well as between nations, that may help in understanding problems of war and peace. Reports about innovative applications, as well as basic research, are welcomed, especially when the results are of interest to scholars in several disciplines.