同步全酬拍卖竞赛中的脊分布和信息设计

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-10-02 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2024.09.009

Zhonghong Kuang , Hangcheng Zhao , Jie Zheng

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引用次数: 0

摘要

两个私下知情的参赛者在比赛中竞争，组织者事先设计了一个公开的匿名披露政策，以最大化参赛者的总努力。我们充分描述了脊分布的特征，在脊分布下，组织者会获得第一最优的均衡结果：分配是有效的，全部盈余都归组织者所有。当先验分布是脊分布和完全相关分布的混合物时，只产生脊分布作为后验的信号就能实现第一最优结果。

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Ridge distributions and information design in simultaneous all-pay auction contests

Two privately informed contestants compete in a contest, and the organizer ex-ante designs a public anonymous disclosure policy to maximize the contestants' total effort. We fully characterize ridge distributions, under which the organizer achieves the first-best outcome in equilibrium: the allocation is efficient, and the entire surplus goes to the organizer. When the prior is a mixture of a ridge distribution and a perfectly correlated distribution, the first-best outcome is achievable by a signal that solely generates ridge distributions as posteriors.

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来源期刊

Games and Economic Behavior ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

9.10%

发文量

148

期刊介绍： Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology