政治关系对公司业绩分布的影响

IF 5.2 1区经济学 Q1 ECONOMICS

中国经济评论 Pub Date : 2024-09-27 DOI:10.1016/j.chieco.2024.102289

Xuan Li , Yanchen Wang

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引用次数: 0

摘要

政治关系有可能将租金重新分配给有关系的公司，而非无关系的公司。本文表明，2008-2015 年间中国上市公司的情况确实如此。当高管更替或政治轮换导致城市中出现关联企业时，关联企业（以高管与地方领导之间的学院关系为代表）拥有更高的资产回报率（ROA）和更多的政府补贴，而非关联企业的资产回报率和补贴都会显著下降。同一产业内的非关联企业与不同产业内的非关联企业受到的不同影响表明，由于领导者试图用广泛的产业政策掩盖偏袒，产业外的非关联企业受到的不利影响更大。

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The effect of political connections on the distribution of firm performance

Political connections have the potential to redistribute rents toward connected firms, and away from non-connected ones. In this paper, we show that this is indeed the case for Chinese listed firms during 2008–2015. Connected firms (as proxied by college ties between senior management and local leaders) have higher Return on Assets (ROA) and more government subsidies, while non-connected firms experience a significant decline in both ROA and subsidy when executive turnover or political rotation leads to the creation of connected firms in the city. The differential effects on non-connected firms within the same industry versus those in different industries suggest that non-connected firms outside the industry are more adversely affected due to leaders' attempts to mask favoritism with broad industrial policy.

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来源期刊

中国经济评论 ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

10.60

自引率

4.40%

发文量

380

期刊介绍： The China Economic Review publishes original works of scholarship which add to the knowledge of the economy of China and to economies as a discipline. We seek, in particular, papers dealing with policy, performance and institutional change. Empirical papers normally use a formal model, a data set, and standard statistical techniques. Submissions are subjected to double-blind peer review.