Departures of Tainted Outside Directors: A Threshold Approach From Two Competing Theoretical Perspectives

Although a tainted outside director’s social status may serve as a buffer against devaluation owing to an affiliate firm’s corporate financial misconduct, the extent of this buffer effect is unclear. We propose a threshold approach by introducing the expectancy violation perspective, which generates a theoretical tension from the network-embeddedness perspective, to clarify the following question: From which perspective does the buffer effect of social status become more salient? Specifically, we propose an inverted U–shaped relationship between the directors’ social status and the departure of tainted outside directors from host firms. We theorize that when directors’ social status exceeds a certain threshold, the network-embeddedness perspective is more dominant than the expectancy violation perspective. Moreover, a host firm’s external stakeholder attention and board social status moderate the inverted-U effect such that its turning point shifts to the right because such contingencies increase the threshold for the buffer. Using a sample of tainted outside directors penalized for associated firms’ financial misconduct, we find evidence that supports our predictions. Our study helps clarify the boundary between the competing theoretical perspectives of expectancy violation and network embeddedness to explain the phenomenon of tainted director departure.