卖方责任与平台责任:平台经济中的最优责任规则与执法

IF 1 3区 社会学 Q3 ECONOMICS
Jeong-Yoo Kim
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引用次数: 0

摘要

在本文中,我们研究了平台以及侵犯知识产权(IPR)的卖家是否应该承担责任。我们首先证明,如果潜在受害者人数非常多,平台责任的社会效益会更好。这主要是由于平台监督活动的一般执行效果。在具体执法的情况下,每个销售合法产品的专利或商标持有者只试图检测自己品牌的知识产权侵权行为,每个销售者的监测活动没有外溢效应,因此无论专利持有者的数量有多少,其监测活动的威慑效果都是一样的。然而,在平台监控包括平台上所有合法产品在内的任何知识产权侵权可能性的一般执法情况下,如果专利持有者的数量很大,其监控活动的威慑效果就会超过监控成本。然后,在一个没有一般执法效应的两个卖方的简单模型中,我们证明了在卖方责任下,如果且只有在有效率的情况下,判给惩罚性损害赔偿的惩罚性乘数等于执法概率的倒数,才会诱发侵权进入的社会最优效应,而平台责任可能不会诱发社会最优效应。
本文章由计算机程序翻译,如有差异,请以英文原文为准。

Seller liability versus platform liability: optimal liability rule and law enforcement in the platform economy

Seller liability versus platform liability: optimal liability rule and law enforcement in the platform economy

In this paper, we examine whether the platform as well as the sellers violating the intellectual property right (IPR) should be liable. We first show that platform liability is socially better if the number of potential victims is very large. This is mainly due to the general enforcement effect of the platform’s monitoring activity. In the case of specific enforcement in which each patent or trademark holder selling legitimate products tries to detect only the IP violations of its own brand, the monitoring activity of each seller has no spill-over effect, so that the deterrence effect of its monitoring activity remains the same regardless of the number of patent holders. However, in the case of general enforcement in which the platform monitors the possibility of any IP infringement including all legitimate products on the platform, the deterrence effect of its monitoring activity exceeds the monitoring cost if the number of patent holders is large. Then, in a simple model of two sellers without general enforcement effect, we show that under seller liability, awarding punitive damages with punitive multiplier equal to the reciprocal of the enforcement probability induces social optimum in which infringing entry occurs if and only if it is efficient, while platform liability may not induce social optimum.

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来源期刊
CiteScore
2.40
自引率
7.70%
发文量
37
期刊介绍: The European Journal of Law and Economics provides readers with high-quality theoretical and empirical research in which both the legal and economic dimensions merge and combine. The journal welcomes articles that promote a better understanding of legal phenomena, legal decisions made by judges, courts or regulatory agencies, and involving economic tools. Theoretical papers are welcome, provided they have a strong basis in law and economics. We also welcome case studies, as well as empirical analyses – including empirical legal studies – and experimental investigations. The European Journal of Law and Economics does not favor any particular topic, but does have a focus on new and emerging problems. European themes are particularly welcome, because we feel it is important to exploit Europe’s considerable institutional diversity in order to build a more robust body of theory and empirical evidence. However, the purpose of the journal is also to showcase the diversity of law and economics approaches, as supplied by an international mix of authors. Drawing on the support of respected scholars from around the world, who serve as consulting editors and editorial board members, the Editors wish to give contributing authors the opportunity to improve their papers, while also offering them a quick and efficient review process. Officially cited as: Eur J Law Econ
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