灵活报告的升序拍卖

IF 0.5 4区经济学 Q4 ECONOMICS

Mathematical Social Sciences Pub Date : 2024-09-10 DOI:10.1016/j.mathsocsci.2024.09.003

Xieji Zhang

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引用次数: 0

摘要

在将多个异质不可分割物品分配给单位需求竞标者的分配问题中，我们引入了一种名为 "灵活报告递升拍卖 "的新型递升拍卖，以平衡隐私保护和递升拍卖的速度。假设竞拍者的行为都是真实的，那么它总是会产生一个瓦尔拉斯均衡以及最小瓦尔拉斯均衡价格向量。如果每个出价人的报告都没有矛盾，出价人的真实行为就会形成纳什均衡。我们的拍卖概括了文献中一些著名的升序拍卖，我们还提供了模拟结果来比较这些拍卖。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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The ascending auction with flexible reporting

In the assignment problem where multiple heterogeneous indivisible items are assigned to unit-demand bidders, we introduce a novel ascending auction called the Flexible Reporting Ascending Auction to balance the privacy preservation and the speed of the ascending auction. Assuming bidders behave truthfully, it always results in a Walrasian equilibrium, along with the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price vector. If each bidder reports without a contradiction, bidders’ truthful behavior forms a Nash equilibrium. Our auction generalizes some well-known ascending auctions in literature, and we also provide simulation results to compare these auctions.

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来源期刊

Mathematical Social Sciences 数学-数学跨学科应用

CiteScore

1.30

自引率

0.00%

发文量

审稿时长

59 days

期刊介绍： The international, interdisciplinary journal Mathematical Social Sciences publishes original research articles, survey papers, short notes and book reviews. The journal emphasizes the unity of mathematical modelling in economics, psychology, political sciences, sociology and other social sciences. Topics of particular interest include the fundamental aspects of choice, information, and preferences (decision science) and of interaction (game theory and economic theory), the measurement of utility, welfare and inequality, the formal theories of justice and implementation, voting rules, cooperative games, fair division, cost allocation, bargaining, matching, social networks, and evolutionary and other dynamics models. Papers published by the journal are mathematically rigorous but no bounds, from above or from below, limits their technical level. All mathematical techniques may be used. The articles should be self-contained and readable by social scientists trained in mathematics.