金钱效仿与恶意区别：行为多样性下的信号传递

IF 1 3区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Games and Economic Behavior Pub Date : 2024-09-01 DOI:10.1016/j.geb.2024.08.008

Junichiro Ishida , Wing Suen

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们在一个标准的信号传递模型中引入了行为多样性，在这个模型中，一部分代理人根据外生分布选择他们的信号传递行动。这些行为主体为战略低类型主体提供了在均衡中成功模仿高类型主体的机会，这反过来又降低了战略高类型主体与低类型主体分离的成本。因此，行为多样性提高了所有类型战略代理人的均衡报酬。该模型还表现出收敛特性，这比标准设定的最小成本分离均衡更直观。

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Pecuniary emulation and invidious distinction: Signaling under behavioral diversity

We introduce behavioral diversity to an otherwise standard signaling model, in which a fraction of agents choose their signaling actions according to an exogenous distribution. These behavioral agents provide opportunities for strategic low-type agents to successfully emulate higher types in equilibrium, which in turn reduces the cost for strategic high-type agents to separate from lower types. Behavioral diversity thus improves the equilibrium payoffs to all types of strategic agents. The model also exhibits a convergence property, which is intuitively more appealing than the least-cost separating equilibrium of the standard setting.

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来源期刊

Games and Economic Behavior ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

1.90

自引率

9.10%

发文量

148

期刊介绍： Games and Economic Behavior facilitates cross-fertilization between theories and applications of game theoretic reasoning. It consistently attracts the best quality and most creative papers in interdisciplinary studies within the social, biological, and mathematical sciences. Most readers recognize it as the leading journal in game theory. Research Areas Include: • Game theory • Economics • Political science • Biology • Computer science • Mathematics • Psychology