当公民将毒品合法化时

IF 2.3 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

European Journal of Political Economy Pub Date : 2024-08-22 DOI:10.1016/j.ejpoleco.2024.102599

Elena Lucchese , Paolo Roberti

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引用次数: 0

摘要

不同国家和不同时期对毒品合法化的需求存在显著差异。本文提出的一个理论表明，执政的政治家可以通过选择毒品法律的执法水平来影响这种需求，而执法水平会影响他们对毒品使用的接触程度以及他们对毒品合法化的看法。如果合法化总体上具有预期的社会效益，那么反对合法化的政治家将比支持合法化的政治家采取更高水平的执法。在这种情况下，与最佳水平相比，执法水平过高。相反，如果毒品合法化会带来总体预期的社会成本，那么情况就会相反。我们以荷兰和美国为例，对这一模型进行检验。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

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When citizens legalize drugs

The demand for drug legalization is remarkably heterogeneous across countries and over time. A theory is presented to show that ruling politicians can influence this demand by choosing the level of enforcement of drug laws which will influence their exposure to drug use and their views on legalization. If legalization has, overall, expected social benefits, politicians opposed to it will adopt a higher level of law enforcement than politicians in favor. In this case, the level of law enforcement is excessive with respect to the optimal level. If instead, legalizing the drug has overall expected social costs, then the opposite will be the case. The examples of the Netherlands and the US are used to test the model.

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来源期刊

European Journal of Political Economy Multiple-

CiteScore

3.40

自引率

10.00%

发文量

106

期刊介绍： The aim of the European Journal of Political Economy is to disseminate original theoretical and empirical research on economic phenomena within a scope that encompasses collective decision making, political behavior, and the role of institutions. Contributions are invited from the international community of researchers. Manuscripts must be published in English. Starting 2008, the European Journal of Political Economy is indexed in the Social Sciences Citation Index published by Thomson Scientific (formerly ISI).