Kevin O'Neill, Paul Henne, John Pearson, Felipe De Brigard
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引用次数: 0
摘要
反事实理论认为,人们的因果判断能力取决于他们考虑其他可能性的能力:雷击导致了森林火灾,因为如果没有雷击,森林火灾就不会发生。为了适应对因果判断的各种心理影响,最近的一系列理论提出,人们对反事实替代方案进行概率抽样,并从中计算出因果关系强度的分级措施。虽然这些模型成功地描述了候选原因和替代原因的统计正态性(即基率)对因果判断的影响,但我们发现,它们对正态性如何影响人们对因果判断的信心做出了更多未经验证的预测。在一个大样本(N = 3,020)的因果判断任务中,我们发现常模确实会影响人们对因果判断的信心,而且这些影响是反事实抽样模型所预测的,在该模型中,当原因的效果在想象的反事实可能性中变化较小时,人们对因果关系的信心会更强。(PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, 版权所有)。
Counterfactual theories propose that people's capacity for causal judgment depends on their ability to consider alternative possibilities: The lightning strike caused the forest fire because had it not struck, the forest fire would not have ensued. To accommodate a variety of psychological effects on causal judgment, a range of recent accounts have proposed that people probabilistically sample counterfactual alternatives from which they compute a graded measure of causal strength. While such models successfully describe the influence of the statistical normality (i.e., the base rate) of the candidate and alternate causes on causal judgments, we show that they make further untested predictions about how normality influences people's confidence in their causal judgments. In a large (N = 3,020) sample of participants in a causal judgment task, we found that normality indeed influences people's confidence in their causal judgments and that these influences were predicted by a counterfactual sampling model in which people are more confident in a causal relationship when the effect of the cause is less variable among imagined counterfactual possibilities. (PsycInfo Database Record (c) 2024 APA, all rights reserved).
期刊介绍:
The Journal of Experimental Psychology: General publishes articles describing empirical work that bridges the traditional interests of two or more communities of psychology. The work may touch on issues dealt with in JEP: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, JEP: Human Perception and Performance, JEP: Animal Behavior Processes, or JEP: Applied, but may also concern issues in other subdisciplines of psychology, including social processes, developmental processes, psychopathology, neuroscience, or computational modeling. Articles in JEP: General may be longer than the usual journal publication if necessary, but shorter articles that bridge subdisciplines will also be considered.