Rural electrification and women empowerment: Do bargaining game approaches with real household items reduce the bias?

In this study, we examine the impact of rural electrification on women empowerment. Previous studies have examined this relationship mainly using self-reported measures of empowerment, and experimental approaches . We conduct an incentive-compatible framed field experiment in a natural household setting. We modify the public goods game by introducing a trade-off between real household items and cash in three scenarios: a woman-only case, a man-only case, and a joint decision case. We then construct a women empowerment index ranging between 0 and 1. A joint decision closer to 1 indicates greater bargaining power for the wife, while a joint decision closer to 0 indicates greater bargaining power for the husband. We then apply propensity score matching to address potential selection bias. We find households in rural electrification villages, to have higher women empowerment index.