一个坏苹果坏了一桶水？门槛不确定情况下的公益供给

IF 1.7 3区经济学 Q2 ECONOMICS

Experimental Economics Pub Date : 2024-07-05 DOI:10.1007/s10683-024-09836-y

Fredrik Carlsson, Claes Ek, Andreas Lange

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引用次数: 0

摘要

我们报告了在不知道门槛的确切位置时，自愿提供门槛公共产品的实验室证据。我们的实验处理明确比较了两种突出的技术：求和技术和最弱联系技术。阈值位置的不确定性尤其不利于最弱联系下阈值的实现，在这种情况下，一个主体的低贡献无法得到其他主体的补偿。相比之下，阈值的不确定性并不影响求和条件下的贡献。我们证明，在这两种技术下，特别是在最弱联系下，非约束性承诺提高了达到门槛的机会。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

One bad apple spoils the barrel? Public good provision under threshold uncertainty

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One bad apple spoils the barrel? Public good provision under threshold uncertainty

We report laboratory evidence on the voluntary provision of threshold public goods when the exact location of the threshold is not known. Our experimental treatments explicitly compare two prominent technologies, summation, and weakest link. Uncertainty in threshold location is particularly detrimental to threshold attainment under weakest link, where low contributions by one subject cannot be compensated by others. In contrast, threshold uncertainty does not affect contributions under summation. We demonstrate that non-binding pledges improve the chances of threshold attainment under both technologies, particularly under weakest link.

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来源期刊

Experimental Economics ECONOMICS-

CiteScore

4.10

自引率

8.70%

发文量

期刊介绍： Experimental methods are uniquely suited to the study of many phenomena that have been difficult to observe directly in naturally occurring economic contexts. For example, the ability to induce preferences and control information structures makes it possible to isolate the effects of alternate economic structures, policies, and market institutions.Experimental Economics is an international journal that serves the growing group of economists around the world who use experimental methods. The journal invites high-quality papers in any area of experimental research in economics and related fields (i.e. accounting, finance, political science, and the psychology of decision making). State-of-the-art theoretical work and econometric work that is motivated by experimental data is also encouraged. The journal will also consider articles with a primary focus on methodology or replication of controversial findings. We welcome experiments conducted in either the laboratory or in the field. The relevant data can be decisions or non-choice data such as physiological measurements. However, we only consider studies that do not employ deception of participants and in which participants are incentivized. Experimental Economics is structured to promote experimental economics by bringing together innovative research that meets professional standards of experimental method, but without editorial bias towards specific orientations. All papers will be reviewed through the standard, anonymous-referee procedure and all accepted manuscripts will be subject to the approval of two editors. Authors must submit the instructions that participants in their study received at the time of submission of their manuscript. Authors are expected to submit separate data appendices which will be attached to the journal''s web page upon publication. Officially cited as: Exp Econ