霍特林模型中的企业相距不远

IF 0.8 4区经济学 Q3 ECONOMICS

Review of Industrial Organization Pub Date : 2024-07-01 DOI:10.1007/s11151-024-09975-9

Oz Shy

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引用次数: 0

摘要

霍特林模型通常被称为 "线性城市 "模型，可能是差异化产品竞争中使用最广泛的模型。然而，除非企业之间相距足够远或位于同一地点，否则纯策略纳什均衡价格是不存在的。事实上，在线性城市中所有可能的企业位置中，只有约 15% 的位置存在纯策略纳什均衡价格。本文应用了 "防暗算均衡 "的概念来求解线性城市中所有可能企业位置的均衡价格。

本文章由计算机程序翻译，如有差异，请以英文原文为准。

Hotelling’s Model with Firms Located Close to Each Other

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Hotelling’s Model with Firms Located Close to Each Other

Hotelling’s model—which is commonly referred to as the “linear city” model—is perhaps the most widely-used model of competition in differentiated products. However, pure-strategy Nash equilibria in prices do not exist unless the firms are located either sufficiently far apart from each other or at the same place. In fact, pure-strategy Nash equilibrium prices exist in only about 15 percent of all possible locations of firms in the linear city. This paper applies the undercut-proof equilibrium concept to solve for equilibrium prices for all possible locations of firms in the linear city.

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来源期刊

Review of Industrial Organization Multiple-

CiteScore

2.10

自引率

9.10%

发文量

期刊介绍： New Online Manuscript Submission System The Review of Industrial Organization publishes research papers on all aspects of industrial organization, broadly defined. A main focus is on competition and monopoly, in their many forms and processes and their effects on efficiency, innovation, and social conditions. Topics may range from the internal organization of enterprises to wide international comparisons. The Review is also increasing its interest in papers on public policies such as antitrust, regulation, deregulation, public enterprise, and privatization. Papers may deal with any economic sectors and any developed economies. The Review continues its primary interest in ideas that can be verified by econometric evidence, case studies, or other real conditions. But the Review also seeks papers that advance significant theories of industrial organization and policy. Papers using abstract techniques and econometric tests should present the methods and analysis in plain enough English so that non-specialist readers can evaluate the content. The Review welcomes submissions from any source, and the Editors will make every effort to have papers reviewed quickly and to give prompt decisions. The Editors will also seek to arrange symposia on specific topics, and they are open to proposals for grouped papers. They also welcome shorter notes and commentaries on topics of interest to the profession. Officially cited as: Rev Ind Organ