Prime matter emergentism: Unity without reduction

I am persuaded that the anti‐reductionist stance of the Mistake‐Making Theoretical Framework is fundamentally sound and will prove heuristically fruitful. But the very success of this framework generates a challenge. Many biologically informed metaphysicians have drawn striking conclusions from the fact that biology cannot be reduced to physics and chemistry. One such conclusion is John Dupré's “disunity of the sciences” thesis which follows upon the alleged “disorder of things.” These conclusions threaten to undermine assumptions underpinning the Mistake‐Making Theoretical Framework. In this paper I argue that metaphysicians need to find a middle path between an unattainable reductionism one the one hand and the unwelcome disunity thesis on the other. This is no easy task, as a survey of various proposals makes clear. I argue that adverting to the long‐discredited Aristotelian notion of Prime Matter is the most economical way of achieving unity without reduction.